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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Policy and Management

SUBJECT: Comments on SECOM Long Range Plan Report
25X1   Draft

REFERENCE: 27 June 1984 Draft Report from
                 Maynard Anderson

    1. I reviewed Mr. Anderson's draft report on 29 June,
and found that it tracks very closely the minutes of the
Working Group's deliberations. I have the following
25X1 comments:

    ° I believe we should go slow on the Section III item
on "the fact of, or degree of religious committment,
(sic) if any." If nothing else, I would not make it
the first item on the list. It is an area which can be
reported on when volunteered by informants. It is
certainly a significant area, but its mention surprised
those in Policy and Plans Group with past Clearance
Division experience. The exercise of religion is
carefully protected by the Constitution; intelligence
agencies must operate within those Constitutional
boundaries.   25X1

    ° The last paragraph of Section IV seems to me full of
things we already know without an Artificial
Intelligence "Red Agent" computer model. We know what
caused Pearl Harbor then, and we know pretty well what
could cause it now. SECOM is already actively working
Behavioral Science issues. Devotiong scarce resources
to building computer models seems to me less productive
than providing training to new adjudicators on criteria
that are already well established.   25X1
           Chief, Special Security Center, who attended   25X1
the SECOM Behavioral Sciences Seminar on 28-29 June,
told me just this morning that   25X1
          reported to the group that the most effective   25X1
adjudicative mechanism is a comparison of the Personal
History Statement, the background investigation, and
the "gut feeling" of the experienced adjudicator.

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While it is true that we are most concerned about
something like 2 percent of the cleared population who
turn out to be problems, I am not convinved that
fitting that 2 percent into some sort of computer-
designed matrix is going to catch the potential
culprit. There is still a lot to be said for the human
experience element in adjudications. In my opinion,
intellignece agencies can ill afford to ignore that
experience.   25X1

° The draft suggests in Section VII that SECOM should
attempt to establish itself in a position of policy
prominence in (the computer security area.) I would
submit that it already has, at least in the area of SCI
computer security. DCID 1/16 is proof, and there is
close coordination between the SECOM Computer Security
Subcommittee and those involved in the Dr. Ruth Davis
Intelligence Community computer study.   25X1

° The draft suggests in Section IX that if a
community-wide leak data base concerning intelligence
information is established, SECOM should ensure
continuing patterns and trends analysis. It is my
understanding that such a move is already underway, in
that FBI Director Webster has approved the assignment
to SECOM of an individual who will be assigned that
responsibility.   25X1

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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY

27 June 1984

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Memo for Central Intelligence Agency

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The attached draft report with cover memorandum
is the final version, I hope. I've prepared
it on the basis of your comments.

If you have additions, or corrections, please
advise as soon as possible.

I hope to present it to the Chairman on
11 July.

Maynard Anderson

Attachment

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SECOM Long-range Plan Working Group

Reference is made to your memorandum, SECOM-D-013, of 18 January 1984, which established subject group to examine SECOM's role in the current environment; evaluate how well SECOM is fulfilling that role; review SECOM-monitored DCI security policies and procedures to assess their relevance and to determine the need to expand, contract or modify them; and, propose a broad program to guide SECOM activities for the next several years.

The Working Group has examined, reviewed and evaluated SECOM's role in today's world. In order to arrive at an assessment, we have considered the environment of the activity; the organizational setting, and the available assets. We have done this in the context of the perceived risk to the assets that we are obligated to protect in accordance with the SECOM mission, intelligence sources and methods. Our goal was not merely to correct any problems that we identified, or perceived, but to attempt to institutionalize , to some extent, the process of refining the SECOM's system of control over its activities.

We did not review SECOM-monitored DCI security policies and procedures to assess their relevance and to determine the need to expand, contract or modify them because it was concluded that such review is the mission of the various subcommittees and working groups of the SECOM, in the cases of specific disciplines, and the Committee as a whole in general mission fulfillment.

With this preface, the Long-range Plan Working Group submits the attached report, in the form of a series of recommendations, as proposals for your consideration.

Maynard C. Anderson
Director
Security Plans and Programs

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